Unprotected on the open internet

The wallet talks to lightwalletd directly. Identity and contents arrive together — the baseline everything else improves on.

IP hidden · P1@L2Req-unlink · P2@L2Local net · P1@L3LGlobal net · P1@L3GFast sync
Direct
ClientInternetlightwalletd
ClientlightwalletdInternet
Direct (no mixing)

Per-actor assessment & trade-offs

Sees

  • Real client IP
  • Every request and every broadcast
  • All request timing and content

Residual / countermeasure

  • Both invariants fail with no adversarial effort — this is the baseline network protection must improve on.

Sees

  • Endpoints, timing and volume of the exchanged flows

Sees

  • Endpoints, timing and volume (collapses with L3L on a direct connection)

Cons / mitigations

  • Needs IP, timing and block-height obfuscation (request blocks out of order + buffer)

Fit

  • Baseline only — offers no protection

Latency model

Regional (40)Continental (120)Intercontinental (300)
Direct240 ms (2 hops)
Geographic propagation (speed-of-light)
Baseline hygiene applies here tooWhatever the transport, the wallet still owes the same Layer-2 discipline: randomize request times, obfuscate the start height, and never broadcast on reaching the tip.Full detail →

Content from the Nym × Zcash reference doc. Latency figures are an illustrative model (not measured).