Nym × Zcash Integration Guide
Network privacy threat model and design document for Zcash
Welcome to the SDK documentation site for wallet integrators. Shielded Zcash hides what’s in a transaction, but not the network traffic that carries it. The packets your wallet sends to submit a transaction, and to read the chain, still expose your IP address and timing. A full node, an ISP, or a chain-surveillance firm can use that metadata to link transactions back to a person, even when the amounts stay shielded. Routing your wallet’s traffic over the Nym mixnet hides that metadata, so transactions are no longer attributable at the network layer. Ironwood’s migration turnstile is one instance: it forces every holder through a transaction whose amount is public. The same network-level gap applies to any shielded wallet. This site sets out which Nym configuration addresses which part of the problem, and how to build it.
Where to next
Network privacy analysis
The analysis in full: which Nym configuration protects which invariant, against which adversary, and under which conditions.
★ Recommended architecture
The per-app hybrid we recommend for native wallets, with the operator checklist to build it.
Implementation guidance
The practical how-to for wallet developers: which SDK crate to reach for, how to wire it up, with code.
Threat model
The actors (L1/L2/L3L/L3G), invariants, vectors and countermeasures the rest of the site is threaded through.
Baseline hygiene
Whatever the transport, the wallet still owes the same Layer-2 discipline: randomize request times, obfuscate the start height, and never broadcast on reaching the tip.